This paper describes a formal framework for uncertain reasoning in the possible worlds semantic theory. It shows that the model theory of belief functions is simpler than the model theory of lower order monotonic capacities. We concentrate on finding a generalization of belief functions with the same simple model theory, which also admits a conjunction operator. We identify collections of belief functions that have a full propositional logic and present our generalization based on this result. We do not completely solve the problem of finding a conjunction operator. We describe a possible application of this research in data mining, namely the combination of evidence from multiple sources.
Introduction
In this paper we present the model theory of belief functions. Belief functions were developed by Dempster [5] and his rule of combination is the corner stone of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [14] . They have been used in other uncertainty logics. The transferable belief model [15] and the theory of hints [8] are two of many examples. Here we address the behaviour of belief functions in the context of the possible worlds paradigm.
As well as addressing the model theory of belief functions, we also investigate the potential for conjunction operators in our model-theoretic setting. Belief functions are inadequate: there are not enough of them to support this connective. We thus conclude that some generalization of belief functions is required. The lower order monotonic capacities are a natural generalization, see for example [4] or [16] . However, the model theory of lower order capacities is considerably more complex than that of belief functions. This suggests looking for a generalization of belief functions that retains their model-theoretic simplicity and which supports the conjunction operator. One tentative suggestion for this generalization is given below. This paper was motivated by practical requirements in addition to the theoretical concerns just outlined. In the field of data mining, or Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD), there is a need for a formal framework within which evidence can be combined. The need arises in two (non-disjoint) KDD contexts: (a) when employing more than one KDD algorithm to extract information from a given database; (b) when attempting to improve the run-time efficiency of a given KDD algorithm. In either case a strategy is to build multiple models, which in turn implies some means for the models to communicate so that their properties may be compared. The need for a theoretical framework can be appreciated through the recent empirical work on combining the models from data mining algorithms [11] . Our theory permits the communication/comparison to take place in a consistent manner. Before going into the details of our theory, it is worth spending a little extra time explaining the KDD requirements and hence the motivation for our work.
We regard an enterprise's database as an accurate sample of the empirical world. This simplification allows us to ignore issues such as over fitting. We wish to discover implied knowledge about this world, via a KDD modelling process which is both efficient and effective. KDD efficiency is concerned with computational complexity and the practical overheads incurred when handling commercially credible volumes of data. KDD effectiveness is concerned with predictive accuracy (e.g. classification error-rate) and the comprehensibility of the revealed knowledge. The notions of both efficiency and effectiveness are relative ones. For example, failure to achieve 100% classification arises from intrinsic uncertainty in the database and the deficiency of the algorithm. It is therefore not surprising that several KDD paradigms exist, within each of which there are several candidate KDD algorithms, [6] . Examples of KDD algorithms are: rule induction; instance based learning; neural networks; genetic algorithms and genetic programming. It can be shown that there is a degree of complementarity between the strengths and weaknesses of, for example, the rule-induction and instance based paradigms, and that certain algorithms perform better on certain kinds of data sets. The data mining practitioner therefore prefers to have available a set of KDD procedures, when exploring a particular data set. The ability to compare and combine, in a semantic framework, the evidence produced by each of the KDD algorithms is therefore important. The theory discussed below is able to combine the evidence from KDD algorithms that partition the data set. This includes many rule-induction algorithms, such as decision tree (DT) builders [13] , and many genetically based algorithms.
Turning to run-time efficiency, one theme of KDD algorithm research consists of reducing the model complexity with minimal sacrifice of accuracy. For example, within the ruleinduction paradigms, a well-used strategy involves building DTs from the database and extracting rules from them. Existing DT-building algorithms tend to produce overly complex decision models when applied to large databases [12] . The result of this complexity is that the knowledge contained in them is hard to discern, and the model is incomprehensible. A solution to this is to build many small models and combine their understanding of the database. To do so reliably requires a meaningful method of performing this combination.
In summary, there are two practical KDD situations which require a sound framework for combining evidence: (a) when using more than one KDD algorithm on the same data set; (b) when attempting to improve the performance of a given KDD algorithm.
Outline
This paper is concerned with what constitutes evidence, the semantic theory of this evidence and the potential for various formulations of evidence to support the conjunction operator. In Section 2 we introduce our fundamental semantic notion, the possible worlds paradigm.
Belief functions are our initial candidate for what constitutes evidence. In Section 3 we define the model and proof theory of belief functions. We illustrate how these theories can be used as a framework for combining knowledge discovered in databases. We also detail our objections to Dempster's rule of combination as a conjunction operator in the context of this paper. Furthermore, we show that there is no acceptable way to define the conjunction of belief functions: there are not enough of them to make the definition of this operator possible.
While belief functions as a whole do not admit a propositional calculus, certain subsets of the consonant belief functions have a full propositional calculus. In the first few subsec-tions of Section 4 we concentrate on these well behaved subsets. We observe that their good properties are due to the nature of their model theory: the possible worlds associated with a consonant belief is cyclic, that is generated by a single point. The conjunction, implication and disjunction connectives over these sets are detailed and we illustrate the logical connectives in the context of the model theory of consonant belief functions.
The main results of the paper are contained in Subsection 4.5. The model theory of consonant belief functions are shown to generate the model theory of arbitrary belief functions, Proposition 4.7, and as a consequence we are able to show that belief functions encode factorially complex model spaces for exponential cost, Theorem 4.9. We are further able to verify the completeness and soundness of the proof theory of belief functions with respect to their model theory, Corollary 4.10. We also give a brief discussion of why the model theory of belief functions is simpler than the model theory of lower order monotone capacities.
In Section 5 we present a further concept of evidence, strongly coherent sets. These are our candidates for the appropriate generalization of belief functions in the possible worlds paradigm. They retain the simple model theory of belief functions, Corollary 5.3. We have not been able to show that strongly coherent sets support a conjunction operator. We do give examples that suggest that they might admit this operator.
Finally, in Section 6 we draw some conclusions.
The possible worlds paradigm

Measuring uncertainty
Uncertainty is a description of our understanding of the world. It is a measurement of ignorance, distinguishing between what is certain and what is possible. We adopt the possible worlds paradigm in our treatment of uncertainty. This paradigm is a popular approach, centred on a semantic interpretation of uncertainty, see [10, Section 5] or [7] for example.
A frame of reference is an event space. Thus in saying that ¢ is a frame of reference, we mean that ¢ consists of an exhaustive (everything that can happen is in ¢) and exclusive (if Ü and Ý are distinct elements of ¢, then Ü cannot occur when Ý does) collection of events. Throughout it is assumed that ¢ is a non-empty finite set. A world is a probability function defined on a frame of reference ¢. We let ÈÖ ¢ denote the set of probability functions defined over ¢. Uncertain information is represented as subsets of ÈÖ ¢ . The larger the set, the more uncertain our knowledge.
The proof and model theory of evidence.
The possible worlds paradigm requires a model theoretic interpretation of evidence. We define later, in Subsection 3.2 and Subsection 5.1 below, different notions of evidence and what it means for a probability function to satisfy evidence. Given evidence and probability function Ô that satisfies , we write Ô and say that Ô is a model of . We let ÅÓ ´ µ denote the set of models of .
The uncertainty associated with the evidence is defined in terms of the set ÅÓ ´ µ. While quantitative definitions of uncertainty can be made, we are content to use a qualitative one. We say that evidence models evidence if every model of is a model of . If models we write . We define a partial order, , on evidence with the property that precisely when . Thus the different notions of evidence discussed in this paper satisfy soundness and completeness [3] . We illustrate the discussion by pictorial representations of model sets. We are able to do this by interpreting ÈÖ ¢ as the ¢ -dimensional simplex. In particular, when ¢ consists of three or four points, it can be represented as a triangle or tetrahedron respectively. The corners of the simplex represent the statements that some Ü ¾ ¢ is certain to occur, and in the diagrams, we label the corners with the corresponding event. Thus points close to a corner labelled Ü represent probability functions with a high value for Ü, while those far from this corner represent probability functions with a low value of Ü. All of the model sets we consider are closed and convex, in fact they are the convex closure of a finite number of points. They are indicated in our diagrams by lines connecting adjacent extreme points.
Belief functions and the possible worlds paradigm
Belief and mass functions
A belief function on ¢ [14] is a function Ð ¾ ¢ ¼ ½ For example the mass function of is Ñ ´ µ ¼ , for ¢ , and Ñ ´¢µ ½. A belief function and its mass function are interlinked via the equality Ð´ µ È Ñ´ µ. This equality gives an equivalence between mass functions and belief functions. Details of this equivalence can be found in [14] . We discuss the benefits of the theory presented below in the context of data mining. To facilitate the discussion, we assume that the KDD algorithms are performing classification by partitioning the attribute space ¢. We may thus consider the models produced by these algorithms to be of the form Ë Ë ×µ, where Ë is the partition of ¢ and × Ë © is the classification function, here © is the target attribute. A partition can be considered to be a belief function by considering the frequency observed for each set in the partition to be its mass. Thus we define the belief function Ë ¾Ë Ô´ µ where the probability estimates, Ô´ µ, are calculated directly from the data set during the construction of Ë. Let Ì Ì Ø µ be another such model. The methodology below allows the calculation of lower and upper bounds on the probabilities Ô´ µ, ( ¾ Ë, ¾ Ì ). These bounds are arrived at through a semantic process and not through a syntactical analysis of the definition of the sets and . If the lower bound on Ô´ µ is high, we are able to conclude that most of the concept expressed by is already covered by . If the upper bound on this number is low however, we can conclude that and express nearly orthogonal concepts.
Belief functions are already actively exploited in the data mining community. For instance, the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence is being used as a data mining tool by the Ulster group [2] .
The proof and model theory of belief functions
Let Ð¾ ¢ and Ô ¾ ÈÖ ¢ , we define Ô Ð to mean that Ô´ µ Ð´ µ for all ¾ ¾ ¢ .
Thus we interpret belief functions as statements of lower probability. The following result is due to Kyburg [9] . 
The scarcity of belief functions
We reject Dempster's rule as an unsatisfactory method of combining beliefs in our model because of its interaction with the satisfaction relation. Neither can we define¨as an outer approximation:
1. ÅÓ ´ Ð¼µ ÅÓ ´ Ð½µ ÅÓ ´ Ð¼¨ Ð½µ. 
Chains and support functions
A chain is a sequence of subsets of ¢:
Ò ¢ The set of chains is written ¢ . The trivial chain is the chain ¢ ; this chain is contained in every other chain. At the other extreme are those chains which are not subsets of any other chain. We set Å ¢ to be the set of maximal chains and note that the chain is maximal only when ¢ · ½ .
Given a non-empty subset È of the chain , the set Ë È is also an element of . Given ¢ we can thus define the set to be the largest element of contained in , is the support for in . When we also employ the set , the largest element of properly contained in . Note that exactly when ¾ , and that . The other main property of the support function that we use is its idempotency, that is .
Consonant beliefs
Let be a chain and Ðbe a belief function. We call Ða consonant belief over if Ð´ µ Ð µ ´ ¾ ¾ ¢ µ Equivalently, Ðis consonant over if the focal set of Ð, the collection of sets with positive mass, is a subset of . For example is consonant over any chain and any consonant belief in the sense of [14 
Witnesses of consonant beliefs
Consonant beliefs have a model theory that can be described by a single probability function [14 
The logic of consonant beliefs
As well as possessing a simple model theory, the set of consonant belief functions defined over a chain has a propositional calculus. Fix ¾ ¢ . We define the connectives ´Ø ×µ is also a belief over . In particular 
The model theory of belief functions
Let Ð ¾ ¢ . We regard the set Ð ¾ Å ¢ as the bounds imposed by the belief Ð. Theorem 4.9 is our principal justification for considering belief functions to be good vehicles for evidence: for exponential cost we obtain factorially complex model sets. It is true that the same can be said for lower order monotonic capacities [4, 16] . However, the model theory of these functions when considered to be lower probability envelopes is considerably more complex than that of belief functions. The complications arise from the presence of 'negative mass' in the Möbius convolution functions of lower order capacities, which imposes constraints on the construction of the witnesses of Proposition 4.7. The Möbius convolution functions are defined from capacities in exactly the same way that mass functions are defined from belief functions, and since belief functions are characterized by the non-negative values their mass functions take, any lower order capacity will have sets which take negative values under their Möbius function.
We illustrate this added complexity with an example. A lower order capacity whose model set is the set ÅÓ ´ Ð ¼ µ ÅÓ ´ Ð ½ µ ÅÓ ´ Ð ¾ µ of Figure 1 has the following Möbius
The negative mass at Ü Ý Þ imposes constraints on the models of this capacity that achieve the minimum possible value at Ü Ý Þ . In assigning probabilities to Ü, Ý and Þ, one must ensure that of the mass given to proper subsets of Ü Ý Þ becomes identified. Constructing models which satisfy this constraint is not trivial. In comparison, the strongly coherent set ¬ of Subsection 5.2, whose model set is also the set ÅÓ ´ Ð ¼ µ ÅÓ ´ Ð ½ µ ÅÓ ´ Ð ¾ µ of Figure 1 , allows one to read off the witnesses which minimize the probability of Ü Ý Þ .
These values, that all happen to coincide, are the witnesses of the belief function ÐÛ of Figure 6 and can be read off from the first six rows of Table 1 .
Localizing beliefs
Coherent sets
Our solution to the scarcity of belief functions is to employ belief functions to represent evidence that applies to a fragment of ¾ ¢ . These fragmentary representations of evidence are then patched together into coherent collections to evolve our final notion of evidence, strongly coherent sets. Let « and ¬ be strongly coherent, then « ¬ if and only if « ¬.
PROOF. Assume that « ¬, by the strong coherence condition « ¬ will follow from Ð ¬ for each ¾ Å ¢ and´ Ð µµ ¾ « using Lemma 5.5. As Ð ¬ is equivalent to Ð ¬ , this condition is an immediate consequence of « ¬. Conversely assume that « ¬ and pick´ Ð µµ ¾ « and ¾ Å ¢ with Ð ¬ . This is equivalent to Ï Ø´ Ð µ ¬ , and since Ï Ø´ Ð µ Ð and ÅÓ ´ Ðµ ÅÓ ´«µ, « ¬.
Finally, we note that every belief gives rise to a strongly coherent set. The proof is straightforward. 
Examples of the combination of coherent sets
In our first example we detail a strongly coherent set « whose model set is ÅÓ ´ Ð¼µ ÅÓ ´ Ð½µ, where Ð¼and Ð½are the belief functions of Figure 1 . To find belief functions that entail both Ð¼and Ð½, we can modify Ð½either by increasing the belief in Ü Ý to ½ ¿ or increasing the belief in Ü to ½ ¿ . The first of these options leads to the belief function Ð of Figure 4 and the second leads to the function Ð of the same figure. The added belief in Ü Ý exhibited by Ð allows the minimal belief in Ü to be shown at the cost of excessive credence in the set Ü Ý Þ . We thus form the interval Ü Ý Þ µ for this belief function, avoiding the overemphasis Ð places on the upper bound of this interval, and derive the context´ Ð Ü Ý Þ µµ. The added belief shown by Ð in the set Ü means that the minimum belief in Ü Ý Þ is exhibited. We form the interval Ý ¢µ to avoid the unwarranted emphasis on Ü , providing the context´ Ð Ý ¢µµ (though the context´ Ð Þ ¢µµ or even´ Ð Ý Þ ¢µµ would do as well). We have constructed the coherent set « ´ Ð Ü Ý Þ µµ ´ Ð Ý ¢µµ . The model sets of «, Ð and Ð are shown in Figure 5 . Note that ÅÓ ´«µ ÅÓ ´ Ð µ.
In our second example we construct a strongly coherent set whose model set is the set ÅÓ ´ Ð¼µ ÅÓ ´ Ð½µ ÅÓ ´ Ð¾µ of Figure 1 . As in our previous example, we must find the bounds for subsets of Ü Ý Þ . As before, moving mass into the singleton subsets of Ü Ý Þ gives the minimal bounds at proper subsets of Ü Ý Þ . The belief function that achieves the minimal bound both at Ü is ÐÜ whose mass function is The model sets of the belief functions ÐÜ, ÐÝ, ÐÞ and ÐÛ are shown in Figure 6 . The set ÅÓ ´ Ð¼µ ÅÓ ´ Ð½µ ÅÓ ´ Ð¾µ of Figure 1 is also indicated in this diagram. In Table 1 we have decomposed ¬ using our results on maximal chains. The rows of this table are indexed by the maximal chains ´ µ ¢ . In the next four columns we have given the restriction of ÐÜ, ÐÝ, ÐÞ and ÐÛ by listing the three pertinent values of these consonant beliefs. We have omitted those restrictions whose model sets are contained in the convex closure of the other restricted belief functions. Observe that ¬ can understate the bounds at , consider for instance the first six rows of Table 1 .
The problem in finding the belief function ÐÛ is analogous to finding the minimal bounds for the set Ü Ý Þ for the lower order capacity discussed at the end of Section 4. However, once the belief functions have been constructed the shape of the model set is easily described. This ability is the motivation for our attempt to find a generalization of belief functions that retains their model theoretic pleasantness. These two examples suggest that there may be enough strongly coherent sets to permit the conjunction of evidence to be performed.
Conclusion
We have constructed a model and proof theory for belief functions as the lower envelope of a family of probability functions. These theories are both sound and complete within the possible worlds paradigm. These theories also have a direct relevance to data mining. While we have shown that it is in general impossible to define a conjunction combinator on belief functions that interacts correctly with the proof theory, we have identified plentiful and well behaved sets of belief functions which support full propositional calculi. The interaction, performed through restrictions, between these sets and belief functions is adequate to describe the model sets of belief functions and gives an interpretation of the extreme points of model sets through the witness functions. These observations lead us to a generalization of belief functions (coherent sets), which share with belief functions the crucial properties that allowed the soundness and completeness results to be drawn. Strongly coherent sets appear to be general enough to describe the combination of evidence. However, we have yet to formalize the calculus of this conjunctive combinator. There are other areas of this research that have yet to be fully explored. One exciting possibility is to define an implication operator on coherent sets, based on the implication operator between sections. Such an operator would give concrete answers to questions of the form 'given an evidential statement , what other evidence is sufficient to conclude that statement is true'.
Our interest in evidence theory continues to inform our work on devising strategies for multiple model algorithms.
